The term "scientific revolution" refers to the historical, conceptual, social, institutional, and belief-related changes in science that took place in Europe approximately 1550 and 1700. This characterization is the traditional one and takes into account the period that begins with Copernicus's hypothesis of a heliocentric cosmos and ends with Newton's formulation of his laws of universal mechanics. The key question for historians of science is whether what is traditionally called a "revolution" really was one; that is, whether what historians of science mean by this expression makes sense or not.
This article therefore begins within the scope of the history of science and ends within the scope of the philosophy of science and other empirical studies in this discipline (sociology, science-technology-society, science studies). This is due to two factors: (i) the fact that the period mentioned in the traditional characterization has changed substantially since the Second World War. Some have extended it to 1750 and others have reduced it to the years around 1610, the period of work of Galileo and Kepler; and (ii) the decisive influence of the work of Thomas Samuel Kuhn (1922–1996), from which point onward, conceptual issues ceased to be a secondary element in purely historical narratives. From Kuhn onward, the scientific revolution will be understood as a set of changes that involve conceptual, cultural, social, and institutional variations related to nature, knowledge, and beliefs.
Historically, after Copernicus's thesis, new conceptions of the cosmos were proposed: Tycho Brahe (1546-1601) contributed new astronomical observations, Johannes Kepler (1571-1630) introduced theoretical modifications concerning planetary orbits and their motions, and Galileo Galilei (1564-1642), Rene Descartes (1596-1650), Christian Huygens (1629-1695) and Isaac Newton (1642-1727) created new theories of motion that adopted the thesis of the moving Earth. Finally, Newton unified the heavens and Earth through his universal laws of motion, thus generating a concept of the Universe that leaves behind the Aristotelian notion of the cosmos.
According to this way of seeing the scientific revolution, Newton's synthesis supposes the change from a closed, finite, hierarchical and qualitative cosmos to an infinite, homogeneous and quantitative universe, making all things unified: all matter becomes of a single kind, there is only one type of laws, one type of space and one type of time. Everything is space, time, matter and cause. That is to say: the Universe. With this, the organic worldview gives way to a mechanistic vision of the world, to the modern mechanical world, the driving force of scientific civilization that will grow exponentially during the 20th century.
However, Kuhn's publication of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions in 1962 ( The Structure , hereafter) calls into question the traditional notion of scientific revolution. Can it be argued that there was a scientific revolution that made us abandon a pre-scientific world view and embrace a modern, scientific one? Be that as it may, there is no doubt that since 1962, philosophy and science have sought to clarify the idea of scientific revolution so that it does not lead to confusion. Is a scientific revolution a mere accident or is it necessary? What pattern does a scientific revolution follow, if any? Is it a leap into the future or a breakdown of the idea of cumulative progress?
A clear understanding of scientific revolution that could answer these questions must take into account at least two fundamental factors: one, that a revolutionary change in science usually entails a drastic conceptual shift, and two, that a scientific revolution requires that we properly conceive of change in science. These factors allow us to organize the topic as follows: first, we will consider the role of scientific revolutions in the history of science and the philosophy of science (Sec. 2). Next, we will present the most insightful view on the matter, Kuhn's (Sec. 3), which is not free from alternative ways of understanding the question, some of which we will (Sec. 4). Finally, we will conclude with some closing remarks (Sec. 5).